A Discussion with Ilan Pappe

I got to participate in a small-group Q&A session with Ilan Pappe this morning at my university. He was nothing short of gracious and approachable, and shared some great insights into Israeli historiography and national identity. He also delved into his reading of the Israeli archives of 1967 and how his interpretation of them will differ from Tom Segev's book on 1967 (I personally love Tom Segev's writing style, though I take issue with some of his historical assertions, especially his omission of Zionist terrorism during the British Mandate). Pappe will also be giving a 2-hour talk tonight, which I will post notes about as well.

A brief summary and points from our discussion:

I asked him why he believed it took so long for both the New Historians and Palestinian historians to address and confront 1948. According to Pappe, for Israeli historians 1948 is a Pandora's box that brings into question not only the actual events, but the legitimacy and morality of the Zionist project and the state of Israel itself. For many, dealing with these historical issues is simply not worth it (as he can probably attest to). On the Palestinian side, it wasn't addressed because of the lack of an academic community in a fractured post-Nakba society, and the fact that it was a publicly shared trauma, the effects of which were, and are, experienced every day. Many Palestinians simply didn't wish to revisit it. It may have been addressed on an activist or political level, but not historical until sometime later than it should have been. Also, access to Israeli archives obviously presents a particular problem for Palestinian historians, and many refuse to rely on oral history, in that it may bring into question the legitimacy of their work. (Pappe disagrees with this sentiment on oral history, but I think it does make sense for an issue as polarized as al-Nakba where the rhetoric and discourse has been so heavily embedded).

Concerning approaches to the Israeli archives dealing with 1967, Pappe says they have until now only been approached form a purely Zionist framework. In his view, the archives reveal 2 main points: 1) Most Israeli leaders viewed 1948 as a major mistake, only because they did not completely push out every single Palestinian Arab from Israel-Palestine. They concluded they could have very well avoided the burden of the occupation and the odd borders of the state had they completed the ethnic cleansing. 1967 was their chance to say "no more mistakes" in terms of Zionist goals. Additionally, the "two-state" solution emerges as a useful facade for peace negotiations. 2) Significantly, they actually internally debated clearing the entire West Bank of all Palestinians (which I find amazing). But after this, the debate on such matters was closed until Oslo. The Israeli conclusion was that the Palestinians can stay in the WB but they will never be incorporated into the state, cannot have independence or sovereignty, and are not refugees but inhabitants. (In would relate this to the post-1967 'separation of the Palestinian people from the land of Palestine') That is, "they were allowed to have an open prison. And if they rebelled they would find themselves in a maximum security prison." He also added that is you pay attention, the language of the Israeli authorities began to mirror that of a prison warden.

(I have a lot of grading to do tonight, but I will add the rest of my notes from our talk later on tonight.)